• Prov 1:22-26
• Hos 11:1-9
• Ps 78:10
• Ps 81:11-13
• Jer 32:33
• Acts 7:51
• Luke 7:30
• Acts 26:14
• Acts 9:17

Additionally, here are several passages indicating Jesus’s understanding of resistible grace:

• Matt 23:37
• Luke 18:18-23
• Matt 21:28-32
• Matt 21:42-44
• Matt 13:1-23 (also Mark 4:1-20 and Luke 8:1-5)

Greek

πᾶς

Transliteration/Pronunciation

pas/pä’s

Strong’s

G3956

Definition

The primary definition is:

each, every, any, all, the whole, everyone, all things, everything

The secondary definition is:

some of all types

This word is hotly debated by the Reformed crowd when it comes to doctrines such as particular election, limited atonement, and irresistible grace. The claim by most Reformed theologians is that pas does not mean all all the time. So, with that in mind, here are several verses where pas makes an appearance courtesy of Whosoever Will:

Where it’s found (as it pertains to salvation being made available to all men)

Matt 7:24, Luke 6:47, Matt 10:32-33, Luke 7:37, John 1:7, Matt 11:28, John 1:9, John 3:15-16, John 4:13-14, John 6:40, John 11:26, Acts 2:21, Acts 10:43, Rom 9:33, Rom 10:11, 1 John 2:23, 1 John 5:1, Eph 1:10, John 1:3, 2 Tim 3:16, 2 Pet 3:9, 1 Tim 2:4, 1 John 2:2, Matt 18:14, Matt 11:6, Luke 7:23, Matt 12:50, Matt 16:24-25, Mark 8:34-35, Luke 9:23-24, John 6:51, John 7:17, John 7:37, John 8:51, Acts 2:21, Acts 10:43, Rom 10:13, 1 John 4:15, Rev 3:20, Rev 22:17

Wes

Pardon the unsolicited message–and I see that with your 3K+ friends, your ability to reply may be limited–but I’m a long-suffering “anti-Calvinist” who’s only now beginning to study Molinism.

I noticed through Facebook’s VERY unprivate data search mechanisms that you are a fairly outspoken Molinist of sorts and some random comments I’ve read of yours lead me to believe you might be prepared to shed some light on a couple of things for me.

Previously, I’d developed a general aversion to any system of theology simply because I saw all “sides” of this or that debate simply bypassing a reconciliation effort in favor of a “these verses mean what they say, those don’t” approach. Now that I’ve dipped my toes in Molinism (via WLC’s defense of it in the book I’ve linked to), I’m at least hopeful. Now, I’m still trying to wrap my mind around some of the hermeneutic’s particulars, but there are two verses, one a proof text for the reformed crowd and one for the openness crowd, that I’m wondering how Molinism addresses.

Reformed: Eph. 1:11

Openness: Gen. 6:6

Whenever you could get back to me, that would be super. Thanks in advance for whatever time you can dedicate to it.

Sincerely
Josh Lowery

Since I love the doctrine of Molinism/Middle Knowledge I decided to try and give Josh as much information on the subject as I could in a single Facebook message. What follows, then, is sort-of the fire-hose method of discussing an otherwise deep and rich subject in a relatively short amount of time.

Hey Josh,

Thanks for the message, unsolicited or not

I am indeed a huge fan of Molinism. As Thomas P. Flint mentions in his excellent work “Divine Providence: The Molinist Account”, Molinism’s twin pillars are God’s sovereignty and mankind’s limited free agency.

As to the specific verses you mentioned. I would argue that Eph 1:11 is primarily referring to Christ and how our redemption is worked out ahead of time in him. Thus the “all things” are directly referring to the salvation brought about in Christ. Calvinists often point to this verse by way of saying that God causes all things. However the idea of causal determinism has some very serious flaws.

The most significant of which is that it ends up making God culpable for all sin, evil, and suffering in the world. You can study more on this vein of thought through Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Theodicy, (my favorite) Bruce Little’s Creation Order Theodicy, and (ok, another favorite) Udo Middleman’s Innocence of God.

I must admit I haven’t encountered Genesis 6:6 used in the open theistic sense but having read a lot of Boyd I can certainly see how it could be portrayed that way.

Basically open theism is, in my estimation, the perfect opposite of the Calvinistic view. However the reason for this is that they both have a wrong understanding of what free will is. Both systems have a view that if God contains foreknowledge of future-free events then that somehow means that men are not free. WLC has an excellent book on this very subject entitled “Only Wise God” wherein he refutes this flawed understanding of free agency in connection with supreme sovereignty and by destroying the linkage of premises in the argument (that is, that 1. God’s foreknowledge inevitably means that 2. men cannot have free causal agency) he, in my estimation anyway, manages to utterly demolish both erroneous views while upholding what a plain reading of the text seems to indicate (that is, that God is sovereign and men’s choices are their own).

So yes, God can lament over the choices of men in Genesis 6:6 and Exodus 32:1-14, as well as change the course of events in 2 Kings 20 in response to prayer all without sacrificing God’s foreknowledge, omnipotence, or without damaging God’s predestined plan for the universe.

How can this be? I believe you’ve rightly discerned what many people have believed intrinsically, even without knowing the formal theological system cobbled together initially by a Jesuit priest. That is the doctrine of Molinism or Middle Knowledge (as many prefer to call it now).

Unfortunately there has not been very much work done on the doctrine on Molinism/Middle Knowledge until recently. Now, however, there has been quite a flurry of work done from a very diverse theological crowd including some staunch Calvinists (like Alvin Plantinga!). In fact, one of the reasons I hold to the system of Molinism is because it has been such a unifying force along such a diverse group of orthodox Christians. I am forced to conclude that, like the extra-Biblical doctrine of the trinity, Molinism is a solid Biblical framework for understanding the interplay of God’s sovereignty and Mankind (and Angelic kind)’s limited free agency.

At any rate, here is a link to the best resources I’ve found on the subject of Molinism/Middle Knowledge.

Also, here is a brief outline I wrote on the doctrine of Molinism a while back. And here is a post I wrote on the biggest objection to Molinism (the grounding objection).

I hope that at least helps point you in the right direction. Let me know if you have any additional questions/thoughts/concerns. Even with 3k friends on Facebook I can always find time to talk about this topic (and many more).

Blessings,
Wes

If I am unable I cannot be unwilling because my inability precludes my willingness either way. I know you tire of hearing it, but it’s an apt description. If I am unable then I am no better off than a robot preprogrammed to run a certain course and as such I cannot rightly be held accountable for that which I have no control over.

On the other hand, if I am unwilling then I logically have the ability to act in a manner other than that which I choose. That my actions are foreknown is not the same as saying that my actions or choices are less free. In fact, you could even say that my actions are predetermined so long as you account for my freedom to choose at some point (aka, in eternity past as part of God’s omniscience as a brute fact per Molinism).

You see, either I am truly free to choose to sin or not to sin (as the Bible teaches) or else I am unable to choose not to sin (a concept foreign to Scripture).

If I am unable to not sin then I cannot logically be held accountable or responsible for choices that are, by definition, beyond my control.

If I am unwilling to not sin then I am not only responsible for my choice but, in light of the holy standard of God, I am unable to bridge the gap I freely created.

I realize that inability and unwillingness have been tossed around the Reformed world as if they were somehow comparable but the truth is that they aren’t.

The bottom line is that we are either free and responsible or else we are not free and therefore not responsible.

Only one leaves God unstained by the sin and evil that exists in the universe since only one allows for other causal agents who had the ability to freely create and choose to sin against the will of God.

As it is written, Jacob have I loved, but Esau have I hated.

Many people have a hard time with this passage as it is often posited as evidence of God’s sovereign choice unto election of Jacob and express damnation of Esau “before he had done good or evil”.

The first thing to note about this section is that the phrase “for Esau I have hated” is derived from the words of the prophet Malachi who, in Malachi 1:2-3, was talking about the nations of Edom and Israel. In the same manner Paul, writing in Romans 9 after a lengthy discussion regarding the need for his fellow Israelites to repent, was discussing the lineage of the chosen Messiah. It is a very large exegetical stretch to come to the conclusion that Romans 9 is talking about individual salvation since the context is the messiah’s lineage. consequently, the pots mentioned in Romans 9:19-26 are not people but nations.

At this point, many (primarily from the reformed camp) will argue along the lines that “nations are made up of people”. While this is true, we are still a long ways away from a particular view of election.

Hebrews 12:16 seems to indicate that Esau was a profane man but you don’t seem to think that God foreknew that or that such a knowledge could have played a part in God’s choosing. It seems plausible that the foreknown, freely made choice to sin was the basis for God’s hatred and condemnation of both the person of Esau as well as the nation that sprung from Esau’s loins; why then would we think that the same sort of freely chosen and foreknown transgressions wouldn’t be the basis of God’s choice to bring the promised seed through one and not the other?

For a more in-depth treatment of this subject I encourage you to listen to:

• Malcom Yarnell’s message “God’s Electing Purpose” (audio here)
• Ken Keathley’s message “The Soulwinner’s Burden” (audio here)

1. We were all sinners (Romans 3:23), separated from God at one point in time. That is, we were under the penalty of death (Eph 2:1) and enemies of God (Romans 5:10).
2. Jesus told his followers to love their enemies, and not just their friends. (Matthew 5:44, Luke 6:27, Luke 6:35)
3. Therefore God loves all men (John 3:16) and even while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us (Romans 5:6, 5:8)

Several conclusions can be drawn from this chain. Namely that all men are in the same boat at some point in their lives. That is, we are all separated from Christ. Additionally, for those who are saved, we have truly passed from death to life (John 5:24). And finally, this change in position before God is a time-bound stance such that there truly was a time we were heading to hell and for those of us who are saved our eternal destination truly changed from “heading to hell” to “heading to heaven”.

The sad reality, though, is that while everyone is dead in their sins and an enemy of God, and while Christ loves all men who are, by nature, his enemies, not everyone is made alive. Why? is it a lack of love on God’s part? Or is it a lack of acceptance on ours?

You see, only one option leave God’s love undiminished.

God is love. (1 John 4:8, 1 John 4:16)

Choose life. (Deut 30:19)

On supralapsarianism and historical Calvinism Keathly writes:

Some Calvinists (following their namesake, John Calvin) cannot accept that there is any conditionality in God’s decrees, so they bite the bullet and dismiss permission altogether. They embrace a double predestination in which God chose some and rejected others and then subsequently decreed the Fall in order to bring it about. Those who hold this position are called supralapsarians because they understand the decree of election and reprobation as occurring logically prior (supra) to the decree to allow the Fall (lapsis), hence the term supralapsarianism.

On the topic of “permission” being an acceptable refuge for the compatabalist position Keathly writes:

The crucial concept to the infralapsarian Calvinist model is the notion of permission. God did not cause the Fall; he allowed it. God does not predestine the reprobate to Hell; he permits the unbeliever to go his own way. But permission is problematic for the Calvinist—particularly to those who hold to determinism—because permission entails conditionality, contingency, and viewing humans as in some sense the origin of their own respective choices. Calvinists such as John Feinberg define God’s sovereignty in terms of causal determinism, and this leaves little room for a logically consistent understanding of permission. I am arguing that what Calvinists want to achieve in infralapsarianism, Molinism actually accomplishes.

On the subject of reprobation Keathly cites David Engelsma’s quote:

If reprobation is the decree not to give a man faith, it is patently false to say that unbelief is the cause of reprobation. That would be the same as to say that my decision not to give a beggar a quarter is due to the beggar’s not having a quarter. That reprobation is an unconditional decree is also plain from the fact that if unbelief were the cause of reprobation, all men would have been reprobated, and would not have been elected, for all men are equally unbelieving and disobedient.

And to this Keathly comments:

In other words, Engelsma is pointing out that if sin is the basis for reprobation, then no one would be elect because all are sinners.

In the final analysis, infralapsarianism teaches that reprobation is as much a part of God’s decrees as is election. Infralapsarianism and supralapsarianism are simply nuances of the same approach, as long as both begin with God’s eternal decrees and reject the notion that God would (or even could) grant any type of libertarian choice to responsible creatures.

On the advantages of the Molinist approach Keathly writes:

The Molinist approach has a number of advantages over both Calvinism and Arminianism, which I want to list briefly. First, Molinism affirms the genuine desire on the part of God for all to be saved in a way that is problematic for Calvinism. God has a universal salvific will even though not all, maybe not even most, will repent and believe the Gospel. Historically, Calvinists have struggled with this question; with most either
denying that God’s desires all to be saved, or else claiming God has a secret will which trumps his revealed will.

Molinism fits well with the biblical teaching that God universally loves the world (John 3:16) and yet Christ has a particular love for the Church (Eph. 5:25). William Lane Craig suggests that God “chose a world having an optimal balance between the number of the saved and the number of the damned.” In other words, God has created a world with a maximal ratio of the number of saved to those lost. The Bible teaches that God genuinely desires all to be saved, and even though many perish, still his will is done.

Molinism better addresses this apparent paradox.

This is an excellent paper which shows how, as open theist William Hasker puts it:

If you are committed to a “strong” view of providence, according to which, down
to the smallest detail, “things are as they are because God knowingly decided to
create such a world,” and yet you also wish to maintain a libertarian conception of
free will—if this is what you want, then Molinism is the only game in town.

Would we be more pious than Jesus? – “I am not praying for the world but for those whom you have given Me” – Jn 17:9

During the course of our conversation on the implications of the thought expressed above I come up with the following logical argument for God’s loving the whole world as opposed to a small segment of it per reformed theology.

Per the ontological argument: We can never be more pious than Jesus.

Since love for the whole world is better than love for a particular “favored” group (per Jesus’s own admonition that it is more admirable to love one’s enemy than it is to merely love one’s friend).

We can see that it logically follows that God must love the whole world and not merely a segment of it since failure to do so would entail the illogical conclusion that we are, per the initial comment, “more pious” than the God who is the very definition of good.

No, it’s not very polished and I invite comments and thoughts on it, but I figured its a pretty good start!

UPDATE:
A friend of mine pointed out that I should probabally post a little more showing my thought process and why I think my arguement fits in with “ontology” in general.

Ontology is the study of “being” and the sense I’m using it in here is along the lines of the ontological argument for God’s existence specifically Descartes’ formula:

1. Whatever I clearly and distinctly perceive to be contained in the idea of something is true of that thing.
2. I clearly and distinctly perceive that necessary existence is contained in the idea of God.
3. Therefore, God exists.

Here, though, I’m attempting to show that God does indeed love the whole world in opposition to the Calvinistic doctrine that God only “effectively” loves a small subset known as the elect.

Well, one example to the contrary¹ is this:

I never locked my doors.

This was because I believed that men had no free will and that not only were all things determined, but that they were causally and directly brought about by God. So that, if someone were to break into my house or steal my car, or even if I or someone I loved were to become ill, such an event or circumstance would be directly caused by God himself so that any interference² would be bad and wrong³.

As you know, this view didn’t serve me very well practically⁴ and the realization that we are commanded to take reasonable measures to secure what we are in charge of or responsible for (which includes people as well as possessions) led me to change my beliefs which, in turn, made me change my behavior.

I now lock my doors⁵ as religiously as I kept them unlocked because my belief in causal determinism vs. limited freedom changed.

1. When I did hold to a view of causal determinism as a result of my commitment to Calvinism.
2. I never did reconcile how all things could be causally determined and yet we still influence their outcomes. This lingering paradox also helped lead me to the abandonment of the belief in causal determinism.
3. I used to hear all the time how we ought to never “get ahead of God” or interfere with “God’s plan”. such notions sound nice, but upon further examination they are neither logical nor Biblically mandated.
4. My car was stolen, keys still in the ignition. This happened in the driveway next to our house, which also was not locked, which contained an infant and a 2 year old inside. Needless to say, this incident was a very clear catalyst to cause me to re-evaluate my beliefs on the matter.
5. I still maintain that all events are predetermined, just not causally so such that my actions do not matter. For more information on how these seemingly opposing views can be safely reconciled to the detriment of neither, see my previous post on Molinism.

In other words, she holds the belief of many reformed folk that God killed her child.

Sadly, this belief is the logical outcome of an a priori commitment to the philosophical presupposition of causal determinism, the notion that God maintains meticulous causal control over His world so that all events that come to pass are not only indirectly attributable to God (He is, after all the creator and sustainer of all things) but directly attributable to God³.

Another variation of this line of reasoning can be seen whenever a reformed person contracts a disease especially a life-threatening disease like a tumor and/or cancer. Almost immediately they are “comforted” by the notion (usually reinforced by others who are desperately looking for a way to comfort their grieving friends) that God gave them⁴

But is the view that God causally controls everything that comes to pass really comforting (much less true)?

While God certainly is sovereign⁵ and while Satan may or may not have had a direct hand in the death of a child or the contraction of a disease⁶, one thing we do know is that God is not in league with the sin and death he came to defeat through resurrection.

If he did, God would quickly become a monster to be feared, for the wrong reasons, and loathed rather than worshiped and loved.

Blessed assurance does not come from the notion that God causes and directs the evil He purports to stand against in both character as well as action. No, blessed assurance comes from the truth that God is wholly opposed to sin, death, and destruction. Indeed, our hope in the resurrection is but a foretaste of the completed victory over all death we look forward to when Christ reigns supreme.

So the answer to the question we started with is; No. God did not kill your child. God didn’t give you cancer. God doesn’t tempt anyone with evil and God is not tempted by evil. Evil is not necessary for good. Death, is evil, an enemy of God.

God is good. God is love. God is genuinely opposed to evil and He really will make sin, death and hell end one day. Just not today.

Until that day we are to have faith that God really is good and opposed to evil and that He really will defeat it in the future, and what we are given until that day as evidence of the truth of these claims is the resurrection of Christ.

For a more in-depth treatment of the problem of evil, I highly recommend Bruce Little’s work along with Udo Middleman’s excellent work: Innocence of God.

1. Who subsequently banned me for the conversation described here. In his mind, it is far better to call one of your brothers in Christ a devil for saying God didn’t kill someone’s child for no reason than it is to admit your pet theological system may have a flaw in it. Gotta love those ‘doctrines of grace’!
2. Not recently mind you. From what I gathered, this happened a few years ago giving her time enough to get the reflection stage of grief which allows for a more objective and rational analysis of events and circumstances.
3. Many who maintain a belief in the 5 points of Calvinism also humorously deny the existence of any other causal agents in God’s universe
4. Or permitted in some milder forms, though He causally controls everything else which serves to merely abstract the ugliness of the underlying assumption of causal determinism.
5. It’s also helpful to note here that sovereignty does not necessarily entail complete causal control over all events. Otherwise, where would we assign the guilt of sin and evil we see all around us?
6. Sometimes our suffering is the result of the pain we find in a broken world